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Abstract
Cooperative communication has been considered as a promising technique to improve communication quality of
service (QoS) in wireless networks, including mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). Due to their unorganized and
decentralized infrastructure, cooperative MANETs (CO-MANETs) are vulnerable to attacks initiated on relays. Although
encryption and authentication protocols may prevent compromised data transmission when a selected relay is
attacked, their cost is high. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic approach to quantitatively analyze the attack
strategies of the attacker so as to make a rational decision on relay selection and the authentication parameter
adaptation to reach a trade-off between security and QoS in CO-MANETs. Simulation results show the effectiveness of
the proposed approach for security and QoS co-design in CO-MANETs.
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1 Introduction
Cooperative communication has been considered as a
promising technique to improve quality of service (QoS)
in wireless networks through the cooperation of users.
The idea behind cooperative communication is that
single-antenna mobile nodes in a multiuser scenario can
share their antennas in a manner that creates a virtual
multiple-input and multiple-output (MIMO) system [1].
Transmitting independent copies of the signal generates
diversity and can effectively combat the deleterious effects
of fading. Particularly, selecting the most suitable relay
among available relays can achieve selection diversity in
cooperative communications [2-4]. This promising tech-
nique has been considered in the IEEE 802.16j standard
and is expected to be integrated into future 3GPP cellular
networks [5].
While cooperative communication brings significant
benefits, it also raises serious security issues. Particu-
larly, mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) with cooperative
communications (CO-MANETs) [6] present significant
challenges to secure routing, key exchange, key distribu-
tion and management, as well as intrusion detection and
protection. For example, it is possible for malicious nodes
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to join the network and relay unsolicited information to
a rogue destination, thereby compromise the network. It
is also possible for some nodes to act in a selfish man-
ner to conserve their own energy and not cooperate and
relay information from other nodes, thereby discouraging
cooperation.
Although encryption and authentication protocols
can prevent compromised data transmission when the
selected relay is attacked, these measures consume scarce
bandwidth and reduce system throughput. It would be
desirable to choose only trustworthy nodes as relays and
only authenticate the packets through the nodes that are
prone to attack. To achieve this goal, we would need
to design a quantitative approach to analyze the actions
of the attackers so as to make appropriate decisions
on relay selection and the extent that encryption and
authentication protocols are required.
Game-theoretic approaches have been proposed to
improve network security [7]. Game theory addresses
problems in which multiple players with contradictory
incentives or goals compete with each other; thus, it can
provide a mathematical framework for modeling and ana-
lyzing decision problems. In game theory, one player’s
outcome depends not only on her/his decisions, but also
on those of her/his opponents’ decisions. Similarly, the
success of a security scheme depends not only on the
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actual defense strategies, but also on the actions taken by
the attackers.
In this paper, we propose a quantitative decision-
making approach that is based on game theory and
takes both security and QoS in terms of throughput into
consideration. To the best of our knowledge, using a
game theoretical approach to jointly study security and
QoS issues for MANETs with cooperative communica-
tions has not been considered in existing works. We
propose a dynamic Bayesian game-theoretic approach
to enable a node to make strategic decisions on relay
selection and authentication parameter adaptation. A
Bayesian game is a game in which the information
about the characteristics of other players is incomplete
[8]. A node in the network can update its beliefs in
the maliciousness of relays according to the record of
attack history. It does not need to authenticate all pack-
ets because there exists a possibility that the selected
relay will not be attacked by the attacker. Compared
with the approach proposed in [9] that authenticates all
the packets without considering the possibility that the
selected relay is cooperative, the proposed game-theoretic
approach only authenticates the packets through the
nodes prone to attack. Therefore, the proposed scheme
can avoid unnecessary consumption of system resources
and leads to a better system performance in terms of
system throughput, which is shown in the simulation
results.
We use an adaptive and lightweight protocol for both
hop-by-hop and end-to-end authentications (ALPHA)
[10], which is based on hash chains and Merkle trees, i.e.,
a tree of hashes. We take an integrated design approach
to optimize the number of messages (or leaves) in the
Merkle tree (an important parameter in the authentica-
tion scheme) and relay selection (an important process
for QoS provisioning in cooperative communication net-
works). We will show that security schemes have sig-
nificant impacts on the QoS in terms of throughput of
MANETs, and our proposed scheme can improve the
system throughput of MANETs with cooperative com-
munications compared to the existing approach [7] that
authenticates all packets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the related work. The proposed game-theoretic
approach is presented in Section 3. Simulation results and
discussions are given in Section 4. Finally, we conclude
this paper in Section 5.
2 Related work
2.1 Cooperative communication
Cooperative communication allows single-antenna
mobiles to reap some of the benefits of MIMO systems.
The fundamental idea behind cooperative communica-
tion is that single-antenna mobiles in a multiuser scenario
can share their antennas in a manner that creates a virtual
MIMO system. It is well-known that the mobile wireless
channel suffers from fading; in another word, signal atten-
uation can vary significantly over the course of a given
transmission. Transmitting independent copies of the
signal generates diversity and can effectively combat the
deleterious effects of fading. Particularly, spatial diver-
sity is generated by transmitting signals from different
locations, thus allowing independently faded versions of
the signal to arrive at the receiver [11,12]. Cooperative
communication generates spatial diversity in a new and
interesting way. As illustrated in Figure 1, in which a node
represents a mobile device with one antenna, two nodes
are communicating with the same destination. Each node
has one antenna and cannot individually realize spatial
diversity. However, it is possible for one node to receive
the information sent from the other, in which case, it
could forward received information along with its own
information to the destination. Since the fading path from
two nodes is statistically independent, spatial diversity is
achieved [13].
In this study, we consider the mobile ad hoc networks,
in which users may increase their effective quality of ser-
vices through cooperation. Each wireless user is assumed
to transmit data as well as function as cooperative relay to
forward received data from its partners.
2.2 Opportunistic relaying
The proposed game-theoretic approach in this paper
adopts a proactive opportunistic relaying process. As the
name implies, opportunistic relaying selects the best relay
according to different relay selection criteria among all
candidate relays to forward the signal between the source
and the destination [14]. An opportunistic relaying pro-
cess consists of two time slots. In the first time slot, the
source broadcasts the signal which could be heard by all
Node 2
Node 1
Destination
Independent fading paths
Figure 1 Cooperative communication.
Yu et al. EURASIP Journal onWireless Communications and Networking 2013, 2013:188 Page 3 of 14
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2013/1/188
relay nodes in its radio coverage and the destination; in
the second time slot, if the signal received by the selected
relay node could be decoded successfully, it would be for-
warded to the destination; the destination then combines
the received signal from the source and selected relay to
recover the information sent from the source. The source
selects the best relay before transmitting the data from
the source to the destination [15]. There is no require-
ment on all intermediate relays to listen to the source’s
broadcasting except for the selected relay; thus, power or
energy spent by unselected relays on listening to the chan-
nel and receiving the message sent by the source is saved.
There are three proactive diversity schemes: fixed selec-
tive decode-and-forward (FSDF) with direct link com-
bining, FSDF without direct link combining, and smart
selective decode-and-forward [16].
2.3 Security in cooperative wireless communication
networks
It is evident that cooperative communication brings sig-
nificant benefit in improving the communication quality
of wireless communication networks. Cooperative wire-
less communication was originally designed with the
assumption that all the nodes involved always help each
other and cooperate in a socially efficient manner. How-
ever, assumption on complete cooperation is broken by
the facts that there exist relays that are attacked by the
network attackers and misbehave for selfish or malicious
intentions.
Thus, it is acknowledged that security is one of the
main concerns for cooperative communication. Various
security issues show the importance of data integrity
checking and the need to have recognized reliable rela-
tionship amongst the different nodes in cooperative wire-
less communication networks. Authentication is a process
that involves in a communication process between an
authenticator and supplicant to identify the identity of
the supplicant [17-19]. Sometimes a trusted third party
might be involved in an authentication process. There-
fore, authentication is important, with the consequent
need to know exactly who we are talking to and make
sure that the message received from a node is exactly
the message that had been sent by that node. Authen-
tication, therefore, supports privacy, confidentiality, and
access control by verifying and validating the received
message. All nodes in the cooperative wireless communi-
cation networks should be able to carry out the authen-
tication and act as authenticator and supplicant from
time to time.
The authors of [20] make a survey that focuses on
node-to-node authentication for wireless communication
networks and classifies authentication taxonomy based
on the type of credentials. Credentials can be classi-
fied into two classes: identity-based and context-based.
Identity-based credentials can be further classified into
encryption-based and non-encryption-based.
For non-encryption based identity credential, informa-
tion is hashed using a one-way hash function and the
key processed by the supplicant. Thus, this method is
computationally efficient. To verify the supplicant’s iden-
tity, the authenticator must own the key used by the
supplicant and know the one-way hash function used
by the supplicant to regenerate the results that were
disclosed by the supplicant as identity. Another form
of hash based non-encryption identity credential uses a
delayed key disclosure as in timed efficient stream loss-
tolerant authentication (TESLA) [21], lightweight hop-
by-hop authentication protocol (LHAP) [22], hop-by-hop
efficient authentication protocol (HEAP) [23], and adap-
tive and lightweight protocol for hop-by-hop authentica-
tion (ALPHA) [10]. TESLA is a broadcast authentication
protocol based on loose time synchronization. However,
hop-by-hop authentication is not supported by TESLA.
What is more, the computational overhead of TESLA is
also high due to the existence of network latencies and
redundant hash elements. LHAP bases on the princi-
ples of TESLA to carry out both packet authentication
and hop-by-hop authentication, wherein intermediate
nodes authenticate all the packets received prior to for-
warding them. However, LHAP also suffers from long
latency and poor throughput and is not designed to pre-
vent inside attacks. HEAP authenticates packets at every
hop using modified hash message authentication code-
based algorithm along with two keys and dropping any
packet that originates from outsiders. However, HEAP
still suffers from inside attack and could not provide
end-to-end authentication. ALPHA, which makes use
of interaction-based hash chains and Merkle trees, pro-
vides both end-to-end and hop-by-hop authentication
and integrity protection and overcomes the shortcomings
of the above-proposed protocols. Therefore, ALPHA is
adopted as the authentication protocol in the proposed
game-theoretic approach for security and QoS co-design
in cooperative wireless communication networks.
3 Proposed game-theoretic approach
In this section, the proposed game-theoretic approach
for security and QoS co-design in cooperative wireless
communication networks is described in detail by set-
ting up the system model and presenting the utility of
the attacker brought by attacking target selection and
the utility of the source brought by relay selection, Nash
equilibrium of the proposed game-theoretic approach,
and equations of system performance analysis.
3.1 Model description
The proposed game-theoretic approach focuses on two-
hop cooperative wireless communication networks, as
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illustrated in Figure 2, consisting of source, destina-
tion, four intermediate relays, and a slow-fading channel
that satisfies Rayleigh distribution. All of the relays are
originally assumed to be cooperative, and the selected
relay forwards the received information from the source
to the destination. However, in reality, some relays are
compromised by the attacker and do not do what they
are supposed to do or do what they are not supposed
to do.
In this paper, we represent the set of relays asR. Attack
on relays initiated by the attacker is independent from
each other. The interactions between the attacker and the
source are modeled as a non-cooperative game since both
the tendencies of the attacker and the source are to max-
imize their total utility through the strategic selection of
attacking target and relay. The attacker selects the attack-
ing probability distribution P = { p1, p2, . . . , pK } over all
relays in R, where pi is the probability of selecting Ri as
attacking target and K is the number of candidate relays in
the radio coverage of the source. In each play of the game,
the attacker chooses one relay to attack; thus, we have∑K
i pi = 1. For the source, it selects all candidate relays
with a probability distributionQ = {q1, q2, . . . , qK }, where
qi is the probability of selecting Ri as relay. In each play of
the game, the source chooses one relay from all candidate
relays; thus, we have
∑K
i qi = 1. We assume that each
relay processes a combination of information and security
assets denoted by αI Ii + αSSi, i ∈ 1, 2, . . . ,K , which repre-
sents the loss of information and security assets when the
attacker’s attacking target selection coincides the source’s
relay selection. αI and αS represent the weights of infor-
mation and security assets in the asset combination.
The information asset of a relay depends on the mutual
information, while the security asset of a relay depends
on its role in the network. In practice, the information
asset is evaluated by the mutual information which affects
the system throughput of cooperative wireless commu-
nication networks, and the security asset is evaluated
in the risk analysis using formal analysis before system
deployment.
3.2 Dynamic Bayesian game-theoretic approach
The proposed dynamic Bayesian game-theoretic app-
roach also consists of two players, the source which selects
the best relay from all candidate relays that brings maxi-
mum utility and the attacker which selects relay as attack-
ing target. The set of strategies of the source contains
‘Select’ and ‘Not select’. ‘Attack’ and ‘Not attack’ consist
of the attacker’s strategies on relay Ri when the attacker
may choose relay Ri to attack; otherwise, there is only one
strategy when the attacker does not choose relay Ri as
attacking target, i.e., Not attack. Since the source is uncer-
tain about the type of each relay, it holds an a priori belief
μ
tk
i , i = {1, 2, . . . ,K} in the maliciousness of relay Ri at the
commence of each relay selection stage tk , k = {1, 2, . . . }.
1 − μtki , i = {1, 2, . . . ,K}, k = {1, 2, . . .}, represents the
source’s prior belief in that relay Ri is cooperative.
We assume that the game in the proposed dynamic game-
theoretic approach is played repeatedly every period
tk , where k = 0, 1 . . .. We assume that the utility
of players in each stage remain the same. We assume
that each relay node processes a combination of infor-
mation and security assets denoted by αI Ii + αSSi.
αI and αS represent the weights of information and
security assets in the asset combination and vary in
various networks.
Source
Relay 2
Relay 3
Relay 4
Relay 1
Destination
Selected Relay
Figure 2 A cooperative wireless communication network.
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If the selection of relay of the source and the selection
of attacking target of the attacker coincide, the attacker
will obtain utility αI Ii + αSSi, while the source will lose
the same amount of utility. Otherwise, the utility for the
attacker and the source is −(αI Ii + αSSi) and αI Ii + αSSi,
respectively. Substitute αI Ii+αSSi byAi, Table 1 illustrates
the utility matrix of attacker and source on relay Ri with
probability μtki being malicious at stage tk . In the matrix,
a denotes the detection rate of the source, b denotes the
false alarm rate, and 0 ≤ a, b ≤ 1. The cost of attack-
ing for malicious node and monitoring for the source, Ca
and Cm, are taken into consideration in our model and
assumed proportional to the value set of relay Ri, denoted
by Ca(αI Ii + αSSi) and Cm(αI Ii + αSSi). Cf (αI Ii + αSSi)
denotes the loss of the source caused by false alarm.
Table 2 illustrates the utility matrix of attacker and source
on relay Ri with probability 1 − μtki being cooperative at
stage tk .
3.3 Bayesian updating rule on beliefs in the
maliciousness of relays
In this section, we define a Bayesian updating rule on
beliefs in themaliciousness of relays, which is based on the
source’s initial beliefs and the source’s record of attacker’s
attacking histories on relays [24,25].
For a given relay Ri, we define a sequence of random
variables Tt1i , T
t2
i , . . ., where T
tk
i characterizes the belief
in the cooperativeness of relay Ri at stage tk . For instance,
suppose that at stage tk ,Mtki packets have been sent by the
source through selected relay Ri to the destination, let Ntki
be the number of packets successfully forwarded by the
selected relay Ri to the destination, out of the Mtki pack-
ets sent to the selected relay Ri for forwarding at stage
tk . Suppose a prior probability density function for T
tk−1
i ,
denoted by f tk−1i (m, n, t), is known, the posterior prob-
ability density function f tki (m, n, t), given the number of
received packets Mtki and forwarded packets N
tk
i , can be
obtained as follows:
f tki (m, n, t)=
f tki (N
tk
i = n | t,Mtki = m)f tk−1i (m, n, t)∫ 1
0 f
tk
i (N
tk
i = n | t,Mtki = m)f tk−1i (m, n, t)dt
,
(1)
where f tki (N
tk
i = n | t,Mtki = m) is called the likelihood
function and defined as follows:
Table 1 Utility matrix of attacker and source on relay Ri
with probabilityμtki malicious at stage tk
Attack Not attack
Select −(1 − 2a − Ca)Ai , (1 − 2a − Ca)Ai −(bCf + Cm)Ai , 0
Not select −Ai , (1 − Ca)Ai 0, 0
Table 2 Utility matrix of attacker and source on relay Ri
with probability 1− μtki cooperative at stage tk
Not attack
Select −(bCf + Cm)Ai , 0
Not select 0, 0
f tki (N
tk
i = n | t,Mtki = m) = (mn )tn(1 − t)m−n. (2)
It can be shown that the posterior probability density
function f tki (m, n, t) follows a Beta distribution. The Beta
distribution with parameters a and b is defined as follows:
Beta(a, b) = t
a−1(1 − t)b−1
B(a, b) =
ta−1(1 − t)b−1∫ 1
0 ta−1(1 − t)dt
(3)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. In particular, if
f tk−1i (m, n, t) ∼ Beta(atk−1i , btk−1i ), (4)
then given thatMtki = mtki and Ntki = ntki , we have
f tki (m, n, t) ∼ Beta(atk−1i + ntki , btk−1i + mtki − ntki ). (5)
Therefore, f tki (m, n, t) is characterized by the parame-
ters atki and b
tk
i , which are defined recursively as follows:
atki = atk−1i + ntki (6)
and
btki = btk−1i + mtki − ntki . (7)
Therefore, belief in the maliciousness of relay Ri at stage
tk is
μ
tk
i = 1 − f tki (m, n, t), (8)
which could be calculated recursively through the record
of ai and bi [26].
At the system initial stage t0, there is no informa-
tion for the cooperative wireless communication net-
works. Therefore, we assume that Tt0i has the uniform
distribution over the interval [0, 1], i.e.,
f t0i (m, n, t) ∼ U[0, 1]= Beta(1, 1), (9)
which indicates the source’s indifference to the selected
relay’s behavior at stage t0.
3.4 Finding Nash equilibrium of the proposed
game-theoretic approach
In cooperative wireless communication networks, both
the attacker and the source have limited system resources,
such as limited battery life and limited computational
capacity; it is natural for the attacker to focus on attack-
ing some targets that are more beneficial compared by
initiating attack on others. We sort the targets according
to their combination of information and security assets
and divide the whole target set into three subsets: sensi-
ble, quasi-sensible, and non-sensible target sets according
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to the weight of each relay’s asset over the overall assets
composed by all relays that belong toR.
The sensible target set RS, the quasi-sensible target set
RQ, and non-sensible target setRN are defined as follows:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
αI Ii + αSSi > |RS|(1−Ca)−2a
(1−Ca)∑j∈Rs 1αI Ij+αSSj , ∀i ∈ RS
αI Ii + αSSi = |RS|(1−Ca)−2a
(1−Ca)∑j∈Rs 1αI Ij+αSSj , ∀i ∈ RQ
αI Ii + αSSi < |RS|(1−Ca)−2a
(1−Ca)∑j∈Rs 1αI Ij+αSSj , ∀i ∈ RN
(10)
where |RS| is the cardinality ofRS.
The cardinality ofRS could be calculated as follows:
1. If αI IK + αSSK > K(1−Ca)−2a
(1−Ca)∑|R|j=1 1αI Ij+αSSj , then |RS| = K
and |RQ| = 0.
2. If αI IK + αSSK ≤ K(1−Ca)−2a
(1−Ca)∑|R|j=1 1αI Ij+αSSj , |RS| is
determined by the following formulas:
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
αI I|RS| + αSS|RS| > |RS|(1−Ca)−2a
(1−Ca)∑|RS |j=1 1αI Ij+αSSj
αI I|RS|+1 + αSS|RS|+1 ≤ |RS |(1−Ca)−2a
(1−Ca)∑|RS |j=1 1αI Ij+αSSj
(11)
Quasi-sensible target setRQ consists of relay nodes
whose assets are equal to
|RS|(1 − Ca) − 2a
(1 − Ca)∑|RS|j=1 1αI Ij+αSSj . (12)
The first step in finding the Nash equilibrium of the pro-
posed dynamic Bayesian game-theoretic approach used
for modeling the interactions between the source and the
attacker is to apply Harsanyi transformation that con-
verts the incomplete information game into a normal form
game. Given that the Harsanyi transformation is a stan-
dard concept in the game theory, we introduce it literally
without introducing a mathematical formula concerning
Harsanyi transformation [27]. For each relay, there are two
possible types, malicious with probability μtki and coop-
erative with probability 1 − μtki . We combine the utility
matrix of Table 1 and the utility matrix of Table 2 to
obtain Table 3 whose components are expected utilities
of malicious type relay and cooperative type relay. There
are two combined attacking strategies for the attacker:
Attack and Not attack*, and Not attack and Not attack*, in
which Not attack* is the pure strategy of the attacker on
cooperative relay.
Table 3 Utility matrix of attacker and source on relay Ri at
stage tk after Harsanyi transformation
Attack, Not attack,
Not attack* Not attack*
Select
−μtki (1 − 2a + Cm) Ai − (1 − μtki )
×(bCf + Cm) Ai ,μtki (1 − 2a − Ca) Ai
−(bCf + Cm) Ai , 0
Not select −μtki Ai ,μtki (1 − Ca) Ai 0, 0
Denote the total utility for the attacker and the source
by UtkA (P,Q) and U
tk
S (P,Q) at stage tk as:
UtkA (P,Q) =
∑
i∈R
piqiμtki [(1 − 2a)Ai − CaAi]
+ pi(1 − qi)μtki (1 − Ca)Ai
=
∑
i∈R
piAiμtki (1 − 2aqi − Ca),
(13)
UtkS (P,Q) =
∑
i∈R
piqi[−μtki (1 − 2a + Cm)Ai
− (1 − μtki )(bCf + Cm)Ai]−pi(1 − qi)μtki Ai
− (1 − pi)qi(bCf + Cm)Ai
=
∑
i∈R
qiAi[piμtki (2a+ bCf ) − (bCf + Cm)]
− piμtki Ai.
(14)
The attacker and the source select their strategies P∗ and
Q∗ to maximize UtkA (P,Q) and U
tk
S (P,Q).
Similar to the Nash equilibrium obtained from the
proposed static game-theoretic approach, it holds that
0 ≤ (1 − 2aq∗i − Ca)Aiμtki = (1 − 2aq∗j − Ca)Ajμtkj
≥ (1 − 2aq∗k − Ca)Akμtkk ∀i, j, k ∈ R, p∗i , p∗j > 0, p∗k = 0,
(15)
which can be shown by noticing the attacker’s total util-
ity function UtkA (P,Q): if (1 − 2aq∗i − Ca)Aiμtki < 0,
then the attacker has the incentive to change p∗i to 0; if
(1 − 2aq∗i − Ca)Aiμtki < (1 − 2aq∗j − Ca)Ajμtkj , then the
attacker is inclined to decrease p∗i and increase p∗j ; and if
(1 − 2aq∗j − Ca)Ajμtkj < (1 − 2aq∗k − Ca)Akμtkk , then the
attacker obtainsmore utility by adding p∗i to p∗k and setting
p∗i equal to 0. Similarly, noticing the source’s total utility
function UtkS (P,Q), it holds that
0 ≤ Aiμtki [ p∗i (2a+ bCf ) − (bCf + Cm)]
= Ajμtkj [ p∗j (2a+ bCf ) − (bCf + Cm)]
≥Akμtkk [ p∗k(2a+ bCf ) − (bCf + Cm)]
∀i, j, k ∈ R, q∗i , q∗j > 0, q∗k = 0. (16)
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To find the Nash equilibrium (P∗,Q∗) of the proposed
dynamic Bayesian game-theoretic approach, we need to
reclaim that Ai > Aj if i > j and
∑|R|
i p∗i =
∑|R|
i q∗i = 1.
From
(1 − 2aq∗i − Ca)Aiμtki = (1 − 2aq∗j − Ca)Ajμtkj , (17)
Aiμtki [p∗i (2a+ bCf ) − (bCf + Cm)]
= Ajμtkj [p∗j (2a + bCf ) − (bCf + Cm)] ,
(18)
we have
p∗i =
bCf + Cm
μ
tk
i (2a + bCf )
+ Aj[pjμ
tk
j (2a + bCf ) − (bCf + Cm)]
Aiμtki (2a + bCf
),
(19)
q∗i =
1
2a [ 1 + Ca −
Ajμtkj (1 − 2aqj + Ca)
Aiμtki
] . (20)
For the proposed dynamic Bayesian game-theoretic
approach, Nash equilibrium (P∗,Q∗) at stage tk is given as
follows:
p∗i
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
= 1
Aiμtki
∑|RS |
1
1
Aiμ
tk
i
−(
∑|RS |
1
1
μ
tk
i
Aiμtki
∑|RS |
1
1
Aiμ
tk
i Y
− 1
μ
tk
i
)
bCf +Cm
2a+bCf i∈RS
∈[0, 1
Aiμtki
∑|RS |
1
1
Aiμ
tk
i
(
∑|RS |
1
1
μ
tk
i
Aiμtki
∑|RS |
1
1
Aiμ
tk
i
− 1
μ
tk
i
)
bCf +Cm
2a+bCf ] i∈RQ
= 0 i∈RN
(21)
q∗i =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1
2a (1 − Ca − |RS|(1−Ca)−2aAiμtki ∑|RS |1 1Aiμtki
) i ∈ RS
0 otherwise
(22)
where
∑
i∈R
p∗i =
∑
i∈R
q∗i = 1. (23)
Nash equilibrium (P∗, Q∗) of the proposed static game-
theoretic approach is the special case of the Nash equi-
librium of the proposed dynamic Bayesian game-theoretic
approach by setting μi equal to 1, which assumes that all
candidate relay nodes are completely malicious.
3.5 System performance analysis
In our model, the system security requirement is defined
as the maximum percentage of packets forwarded to the
destination through the selected relay that are compro-
mised by the attacker if the attacker’s attacking target
selection coincides with the source’s relay selection.
Denote the utility brought by a successful attack on tar-
geted relay Ri as uA(pi, qi). We assume that the attacker
prefers selecting relay Ri with the attacking probability
p∗i that maximizes uA(pi, qi) as its attacking target; the
attacker’s attacking target selection may coincide with the
source’s relay selection. If the attacker’s selection coin-
cides with the relay selection of the source, then both
identity-authentication and packet-integration checking
processes are needed to guarantee a secured communica-
tion. However, when a decision on relay selection is made,
the source could not make sure which relay is the target of
the attacker except for a probability of being attacked, but
the source could detect the attack initiated by the attacker
on relays. Therefore, with the satisfaction of the system
security requirement, the source would not necessarily
authenticate all packets, according to the possibility that
packets forwarded by the selected relay are not compro-
mised by the attacker because the source’s relay selection
is different from the attacker’s attacking target selection.
Since not all the packets sent by the source are needed
to be authenticated, compared with the stringent authen-
tication relay selection method [28], which authenticates
all transmitted packets, the proposed game-theoretic
approach provides a quantitative approach to calculate the
authentication probability based on the attacker’s attack-
ing probabilities on relays and system security require-
ment and to avoid the unnecessary consumption of system
resources.
Denote the probability of message authentication as pa.
To satisfy system security requirement ps, we have 0 ≤
(1 − pa) · p∗i ≤ ps by selecting relay Ri as relay with
probability p∗i being attacked by the attacker.
3.5.1 Outage probability and capacity
In the proposed game-theoretic approach, denote Ii as
the maximum value between the mutual information of
direct communication IDC and theminimal value between
ISRi , the mutual information between the source and the
selected relay Ri, and IMRC, the mutual information sum of
source destination and relay Ri destination [29].We define
SNR as the average signal-to-noise ratio from the source
node to the destination node [16]. IDC is given by:
IDC = log2(1 + |hSD|2SNR) (24)
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and ISRi is given by:
ISRi =
1
2 log2(1 + |hSRi |
2SNR), (25)
where |hSRi | is the channel between the source and relay
Ri. Given the half-duplex constraint in cooperative wire-
less communication networks which means a relay could
not transmit and receive signal simultaneously, the factor
1
2 mirrors the two time slots for relaying. IMRC is given by:
IMRC = 12 log2(1 + (|hSD|
2 + |hRiD|2)SNR), (26)
where |hSD| is the channel between the source and the
destination and |hRiD| is the channel between the selected
relay Ri and the destination.
Suppose the data transmission rate between the source
and the destination is r, the outage probability PIiout
is defined as the probability that the mutual informa-
tion Ii between the source and the destination through
relay Ri is lower than the transmission data rate r, i.e.,
PIiout = P{Ii < r}, which characterizes the probability of
transmission data loss.
In the case of the proposed game-theoretic approach,
the outage probability is defined as follows:
PIiout = P{max{IDC,min{ISRi , IMRC}} < r}, (27)
from which we can obtain,
PIiout = 1 − v +
ω
(dαSRi+d
α
RiD)(v(1−dRiD) − 1)
1 − dαRiD
, (28)
where ω equals to exp(2 ln v − (ln v)2γ ) and v equals to
exp(− 2r−1
γ
). dSRi denotes the distance between the source
and selected relay Ri, dRiD denotes the distance between
selected relay Ri and the destination, and γ denotes the
average transmitted SNR between any nodes.
The outage capacity CI is defined as the largest data
transmission rate r that can be supported if the outages are
allowed to occur with a certain probability , which is the
probability that the transmission cannot be decoded with
negligible error probability. Solving PIiout = , we have v .
Thus, we have
CI = log2(1 + γ ln(
1
v , γ
)). (29)
Outage capacity is used instead of Shannon capacity in
slow-fading channel since the slow-fading channel is dif-
ferent from the additive white Gaussian noise channel as
delay constraints on the order of channel coherence time.
3.5.2 Bit error rate
Bit error rate (BER) is the percentage of bits that has errors
relative to the total number of bits sent in a transmission.
The end-to-end BER, is given by:
PIie = PSRiout · PDCe + (1 − PSRiout) · Pdiv,ie , (30)
where PSRiout is the outage probability of the link from the
source to the selected relay Ri [30], PDCe is the probability
of error in direct communication form source to destina-
tion over Rayleigh channel, and Pdiv,ie is the probability that
an error occurs in combined transmission from the source
to the destination through the selected relay Ri. PSRiout is
given as follows:
PSRiout = 1 − exp(−(
22r − 1
γSRi
)). (31)
PDCe is given by:
PDCe =
1
2 (1 −
√
γSD
1 + γSD ). (32)
Pdiv,ie is given as follows:
Pdiv,ie =
1
2[1+
1
γRiD − γDC
(
γDC√
1 + 1
γDC
− γRiD√
1 + 1
γRiD
)] ,
(33)
where γDC denotes the SNR between the source and
the destination and γRiD denotes the SNR between the
selected relay Ri and the destination.
3.5.3 System throughput
We derive the throughput for partial authentication
process with ALPHA-M protocol [10] and modify
it to cover both direct communication and source-
relay-destination communication. Furthermore, we for-
mulate the throughput equations for both selective
repeat [31] and Go-Back-N [32] automatic repeat request
retransmission schemes by taking the error rate into
consideration.
The payload for packets with authentication is given as
follow:
Spayload = n · pa · (Spacket − Sh(log2(n)	 + 1)), (34)
where Spayload is the amount of payload that can be trans-
mitted with a single pre-signature, n is the number of data
blocks at the bottom of the Merkle tree, Spacket is the size
of packet, and Sh is the hash output [10].
The payload for packets without authentication is
S′payload = n · (1 − pa) · (Spacket − Sh). (35)
Generally, throughput is defined as the payload divided
by the total time used for processing and transmitting the
payload. In our case, the total time spent on payload pro-
cessing and transmitting consists of two parts:T1, the time
for the initial pre-signature process between the source
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Table 4 Time parameters in T1
tprop1 tf1 tproc1 tack1
TDC1 2(
dSD
c ) 1 3 1
TSRD1 2(
dSRi
c ) + 2(
dRiD
c ) 2 5 2
and the destination, andT2, the time for the actual authen-
ticated and non-authenticated message transmission and
delivery. The general throughput T could then be defined
as:
T =
Spayload + S′payload
T1 + T2 . (36)
The values for the time parameters in T1 and T2 vary
according to two communication paths, direct communi-
cation and source-relay-destination, which are presented
in Tables 4 and 5.
The message sequence charts that show the transmis-
sion of message from the source to the destination and
acknowledgment between the destination and the source
with and without the use of relay are shown in Figure 3.
The parameters presented in Tables 4 and 5 are
explained as follows:
• tprop1 is the propagation time for the S1 packet from
the source to the destination or the propagation time
for the A1 packet sent from the destination to the
source. In the case of direct communication, tprop1 is
given by dSDc , where dSD is the distance between the
source and the destination and c is the speed of light.
In the case of source-relay-destination, this consists
of the time for the S1 packet sent from the source to
the selected relay Ri and from the selected relay Ri to
the destination or for the A1 packet sent from the
destination to the selected relay Ri and from the
selected relay Ri to the source, which is given by the
sum of dSRic and
dRiD
c .• tprop2 is the propagation time for the S2 packet from
the source to the destination or for the A2 packet
from the destination to the source. In the case of
direct communication, this is given by dSDc . In case of
source-relay-destination, this consists of the
propagation time for the S2 packet from the source to
the selected relay Ri and from the selected relay Ri to
the destination or for the A2 packet from the
destination to the selected relay Ri and from the
Table 5 Time parameters in T2
tprop2 tf2 tproc2 tack2
TDC2 2(
dSD
c ) n 1 1
TSRD2 2(
dSRi
c ) + 2(
dRiD
c ) n + 1 3 2
selected relay Ri to the source, which is given by the
sum of dSRic and
dRiD
c .• tf1 is the packet transmission time for the S1 packet,
which is given by uf1r . uf1 is the number of bits in the
S1 packet, and r is the data transmission rate.
• tf2 is the packet transmission time for the S2 packet,
which is given by uf2r . uf2 is the number of bits in the
S2 packet, and r is the data transmission rate.
• tack1 is the packet transmission time for the A1 packet,
which is given by uack1r . uack1 is the number of bits in
the A1 packet, and r is the data transmission rate.
• tack2 is the packet transmission time for the A2 packet,
which is given by uack2r . uack2 is the number of bits in
the A2 packet, and r is the data transmission rate.
• tproc1 is the processing time at the source and the
destination for S1 and A1 packets in direct
communication, which includes the Merkle tree
generating time for S1 packet at the source and the
acknowledgment Merkle tree for A1 packet at the
destination along with processing at the selected relay
Ri in source-relay-destination.
• tproc2 is the processing time at the source and the
destination for S2 and A2 packets in direct
communication, along with processing time at the
selected relay Ri in source-relay-destination.
Wireless channels have high error rates due tomultipath
fading which characterizes mobile radio channels. How-
ever, many networks require that the error rates should be
significantly small. In addition to the poor channel quality,
the design of wireless communication systems is compli-
cated by the rapidly changing quality of the radio channel
[33]. To increase the apparent quality of a communication
channel, two distinct approaches are used:
• Forward error correction which employs
error-correcting codes to combat bit errors which are
due to channel imperfections by adding redundancy,
such as henceforth parity bits, to information packets
before they are transmitted. This redundancy is used
by the receiver to detect and correct errors that are
introduced in the transmission process.
• Automatic repeat request (ARQ) wherein only error
detection capability is provided and no attempt to
correct any packets received in error is made. Packets
received in error are retransmitted by the sender.
In the throughput analysis, ARQ retransmission is
incorporated, and the following is a brief review of three
typical ARQ retransmission schemes [34].
• Stop and wait (SW) ARQ. When using the SW ARQ
scheme, the sender transmits a packet only when all
Yu et al. EURASIP Journal onWireless Communications and Networking 2013, 2013:188 Page 10 of 14
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2013/1/188
DRSDS
MT Preparation tproc1 MT Preparation tproc1
tprop1 tprop1
tf1 tf1
T1 tproc1 tproc1
tprop1 tprop1
tack1 tf1
tproc1 T1 tproc1
tprop2 tprop1
tf2 tack1
tf2 tproc1
T2 tf2 tprop1
tf2 tack1
tproc2 tproc1
tprop2 tprop2
tack2 tf2
tproc2
tprop2
tf2
T2 tf2
tproc2
tprop2
tack2
tproc2
tprop2
tack2
Direct Communication
Source-Relay-Destination
S1
A1
S2-m1
A2
A2
A2
A2
S2-m3
S2-m2
S2-m4
S1
S1
A1
A1
S2-m1
A2
S2-m2
S2-m1
S2-m2
A2
A2
A2
Figure 3Message sequence charts in direct communication and source-relay-destination communication.
previously transmitted packets have been successfully
acknowledged by the receiver. Hence, when using
SW ARQ scheme, the sender, after transmitting a
packet, waits for its acknowledgment. Once its
acknowledgment has been received, the next packet
is transmitted. However, if an acknowledgment does
not arrive until a timeout timer expires, the packet is
retransmitted by the sender. Therefore, in SW ARQ,
there is never more than a single packet that is
unacknowledged at any given instant of time. Since
the sender does not use the available channel during
time intervals, it waits for an acknowledgment and
the maximum data transfer rate that can be
supported is limited. This limits cases where the SW
ARQ protocol can be employed. Huge buffer is
needed to buffer unacknowledged packets.
• Selective repeat (SR) ARQ. Unlike SW ARQ, when
using SR ARQ, packets are transmitted continuously
by the sender. As before, the receiver acknowledges
each successfully received packet by transmitting an
ACK bearing the sequence number of the packet
being acknowledged. If an acknowledgment is not
received for a packet before the expiration of the
timeout, the packet is retransmitted. Once a packet
has been retransmitted, the sender resumes
transmission of packets from where it is left off, i.e., if
a is the packet with the largest sequence number that
has been transmitted, packet with sequence number
a + 1 is transmitted next. Here, we assume that no
other timers have expired in the meantime. Since the
SR ARQ protocol is employed, packets are
continuously being transmitted and the inefficiency
associated with SW ARQ is eliminated. Observe that
when SR ARQ is employed, packets can be accepted
out of sequence. Hence, packets received out of
sequence have to be buffered and sequenced before
they can be delivered.
• Go-Back-N (GBN) ARQ. When GBN ARQ is
employed, packets are transmitted continuously as in
SR ARQ. However, the receiver accepts packets only
in the order in which they were transmitted. Packets
received out of sequence are discarded and not
acknowledged. Since the receiver accepts packets
only in sequence, after a timeout, the sender
retransmits the packet that timed out and all packets
with sequence numbers that follow the one that was
retransmitted. Hence, each time a timeout occurs, all
packets that are yet to be acknowledged are
retransmitted. It is important to observe that GBN
ARQ attempts to combine the desirable features of
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SR and SW ARQs, i.e., packets are transmitted
continuously, as in SR ARQ, without the need to
buffer out-of-sequence packets and there is no
re-sequencing overhead.
To incorporate the error control schemes into our
throughput equation, we expand the general throughput
equation by including the error rate. Define the packet
error rate Pc as the probability that the received packet
with the length of Spacket bits contains no error as Pc =
(1 − PIie )Spacket . Let TSR denote the modified throughput
with SR ARQ, which is given as follows:
TSR =
(Spayload + S′payload) · Pc
T1 + T2 . (37)
Concerning the GBN ARQ, the throughput equation is
further modified to allow the retransmission of an error
frame along with all frames that have been transmitted
until the time a negative acknowledgment is received from
the destination. Thus, the modified throughput with GBN
ARQ, denoted by TGBN, is given as:
TGBN =
(Spayload + S′payload) · Pc
T1 + T2[Pc + (1 − Pc)Ws] , (38)
where Ws is the window size which is calculated by
dividing the product of the data rate of the transmission
channel and the reaction time by the packet size.
3.5.4 Optimizing the number ofmessages
Besides strategically selecting relay, the source also needs
to determine the optimal number of messages once its
relay is selected. For various packet sizes Spacket and
authentication probability pa, the optimal value of the
number of messages n that results in the highest through-
put is denoted as n∗. The optimal number of messages for
selected relay Ri is driven from:
n∗ = argmax
n
T(Ri, Spacket, n, pa), (39)
where n ∈ {1, 2, . . .} for the selected relay Ri.
4 Simulation results and discussions
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed game-theoretic approach for security and QoS co-
design in cooperative wireless communication networks
S D
300 m
1000 m
R1 R3
R4R2
Figure 4 Simulation topology.
Table 6 Nash equilibrium and players’ utility in the
military network
Nash equilibrium Players’ utility
p∗1 = 0.23256, q∗1 = 0.4 uA(p∗1 , q∗1) = 0.062792, uD(p∗1 , q∗1) = −0.069271
p∗2 = 0.30814, q∗2 = 0.35 uA(p∗2 , q∗2) = 0.083198, uD(p∗2 , q∗2) = −0.088225
p∗3 = 0.4593, q∗3 = 0.25 uA(p∗3 , q∗1) = 0.12401, uD(p∗1 , q∗1) = −0.12759
p∗4 = 0, q∗4 = 0 uA(p∗4 , q∗4) = 0, uD(p∗4 , q∗4) = 0
through extensive simulations using matrix laboratory
(MATLAB, Mathworks, Natick, MA, USA). All simula-
tions are executed on a laptop featured with Windows 7
(Microsoft, Redmond,WA, USA), Intel Core Duo 2.1 GHz
CPU (Santa Clara, CA, USA), 2-GB memory, and MAT-
LAB R2010b. As illustrated in Figure 4, we set up a net-
work topology with the source and the destination located
1,000 m apart in two separate corners and four relays ran-
domly located between the source and the destination in
an area of 1, 000 × 300 m2. We set the transmission data
rate equal to 1 Mbps, path loss exponent equal to 3.5, and
fixed outage probability equal to 0.01.
Similar to [35], firstly, we consider a network with
emphasis on system security, e.g., military network, where
there are tight confidential requirements. In this network,
the security asset weights heavier than the information
asset and the combined asset is much higher than the
attack monitoring cost, e.g., αI < αS and Ca,Cm,Cf 
1. We set Ca = Cm = 0.01 and Cf = 0.01. Termi-
nals in military network usually own high-performance
attack monitoring equipments and powerful processing
capability; thus, we set a = 0.9 and b = 0.05.
Secondly, a network with loose emphasis on system
security is considered, e.g., commercial WLAN. In this
network, the information asset weights heavier than the
security asset and the related attacking and attack mon-
itoring cost is relatively high, i.e., αI > αS, and we set
Ca = Cm = 0.1 and Cf = 0.3. The terminals in the com-
mercial network are not as efficient as those in themilitary
network; thus, we set a = 0.6 and b = 0.2.
In both networks, there are four relays with normal-
ized information and security assets: Ai = (5 − i) · 0.25,
i = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Tables 6 and 7 show the NE(P∗,Q∗) of the
Table 7 Nash equilibrium and players’ utility in the
commercial network
Nash equilibrium Players’ utility
p∗1 = 0.26984, q∗1 = 0.46154 uA(p∗1 , q∗1) = 0.093407, uD(p∗1 , q∗1) =−0.18676
p∗2 = 0.31746, q∗2 = 0.36583 uA(p∗2 , q∗2) = 0.10989, uD(p∗2 , q∗2) =−0.17233
p∗3 = 0.4127, q∗3 = 0.17308 uA(p∗3 , q∗3) = 0.14286, uD(p∗3 , q∗3) =−0.1752
p∗4 = 0, q∗4 = 0 uA(p∗4 , q∗4) = 0, uD(p∗4 , q∗4) = 0
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Figure 5 Dynamic attacking target and selected relay.
proposed static game-theoretic approach obtained using
analytical results. As shown in Tables 6 and 7, both the
attacker and the source focus only on the relays in the
sensible target set, which bring them more utility.
The setup of the parameters is a non-trivial task for
the proposed scheme. In constructing these parameters,
we assume that most network properties can be made
known, which should be realistic in practical networks,
where initial planning and network management is an a
priori requirement.
The attacker would choose the relay that brings max-
imum attacking utility as its attacking target. According
to the obtained Nash equilibrium, the attacker in the mil-
itary network is prone to select relay 3 as its attacking
target. However, in the real network, the attacking tar-
get is selected randomly by the attacker. To simulate the
randomness of attacker’s selection on attacking target,
we generate random numbers r′ that satisfy 0-1 uniform
distribution and set following attacking target selection
standard, e.g., if (i−1)∗0.25 ≤ r′ < i∗0.25, i = {1, 2, 3, 4},
relay i is selected as attacking target.
In this section, we discuss dynamic beliefs in the mali-
ciousness of relays according to the attacker’s attack-
ing histories on relays and dynamic total utility of the
source brought by its dynamic beliefs in the malicious-
ness of relays. At each stage, the source updates its
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Figure 6 Dynamic belief in the maliciousness of relay 1.
belief in maliciousness of the selected relay according
to its record of attacker’s attack on the selected relay.
At each stage, if the selected relay by the source is also
selected by the attacker as attacking target, packets sent
to the destination through the selected relay are consid-
ered compromised and could not be used by the des-
tination to recover the original information sent by the
source; otherwise, packets sent through the selected relay
arrive at the destination without being compromised and
could be used by the destination to recover the original
information.
Figure 5 shows the simulation results of dynamic change
of attacking target of the attacker and the dynamic change
of the selected relay of the source for the first 20 con-
secutive stages of the proposed dynamic game-theoretic
approach.
Figures 6 and 7 show the dynamic belief change of the
source in the maliciousness of relays 1 and 4, respectively.
The source updates its beliefs in the maliciousness of
relays according to its record of attacker’s attack on relays.
At the commence of simulations, the source’s beliefs in the
maliciousness of all relays are unbiased; in another word,
belief in the maliciousness and cooperativeness is 50:50.
Between every two consecutive stages, the source mon-
itors the attacking target selection of the attacker. If the
selected relay by the source is not the attacking target,
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Figure 7 Dynamic belief in the maliciousness of relay 4.
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then the source increases its belief in the cooperativeness
of the selected relay; if the selected relay is selected as
attacking target, then the source increases its belief in the
maliciousness of the selected relay; otherwise, other relays
are neither selected as relay by the source nor are selected
as attacking target by the attacker, and the source’s beliefs
in the maliciousness or cooperativeness of other relays
stay unchanged.
As shown in Figure 5, at stage 1, the observed attack-
ing target is relay 4, and the relay selected by the source
is relay 1. At this stage, the attacking target does not coin-
cide with the selected relay. Therefore, the source’s belief
in the maliciousness of relay 1 decreases, the source’s
belief in the maliciousness of relay 4 increases, and the
source’s beliefs in the maliciousness of relays 2 and 3 stay
unchanged. Simulation results in Figures 6 and 7 keep
consensus with the above analysis. Figure 8 shows the
comparison of the total utility of the source in the mili-
tary and commercial networks in the first 20 stages. The
source in the military network has lower monitoring cost
Cm and false alarming cost Cf ; thus, when each relay is
assigned the same amount of combined information and
security assets, the total utility obtained by the source
in the military network is higher than the total utility
obtained by the source in the commercial network.
In this section, we discuss the impact of dynamic
belief update in the maliciousness of relays on system
throughput and compromising probability of the pro-
posed dynamic game-theoretic approach, which enables
the source update its beliefs in the maliciousness of
relays based on the attacker’s attacking histories on
selected relays. Numerous simulations are executed to
draw reliable results concerning the impact of dynamic
beliefs in the maliciousness of relays on throughput and
compromising probability.
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Figure 8 Comparison of dynamic total utility of the source in the
military and commercial networks.
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Figure 9 Dynamic compromising probability comparison
between the military and commercial networks.
Compromising probability comparison between the
military and commercial networks is shown in Figure 9.
From Figure 9, we can see that the compromising prob-
ability of the military network is smaller than that of the
commercial network. Since the security requirement of
the military network is more stringent than the security
requirement of the commercial network, the authentica-
tion probability of the military network is higher than
the authentication probability of the commercial network.
Figure 10 shows the throughput comparison between
the military and commercial networks. From Figure 10,
we can see that the system throughput of the commer-
cial network is higher than that of the military net-
work due to the higher authentication probability of the
military network.
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Figure 10 Dynamic throughput comparison between the
military and commercial networks (SNR = 30 dB).
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a game theoretical
approach for security andQoS co-design inMANETswith
cooperative communications. With the consideration of
system throughput and system security requirement, the
proposed game theoretical approach enables the system
to strategically select its relay by dynamically updating its
belief in the maliciousness of relays according to its record
of attacks. Simulation results have been presented to show
the effectiveness of the proposed dynamic game-theoretic
approach. Future work is in progress to consider multi-
hop/multirelay cooperative communications in MANETs.
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